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DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON  
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON  
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU  
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

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SUBJECT: DARFUR ROUNDUP: SPLM MINISTER RECOUNTS AMBUSH IN SOUTH  
DARFUR; SKEPITICISM ABOUNDS ON MINNAWI-TAHA AGREEMENT

REF A) KHARTOUM 1331

B) KHARTOUM 1445

11. (SBU) Summary: SPLM South Darfur Agriculture Minister Omer Abdel Rahman Adam survived a harrowing ambush attempt, but refused to speculate on the perpetrators. The incident has ignited outrage in Darfur and as well as Juba, where Salva Kiir has ordered the formation of an investigative committee. Meanwhile, SLM/MM former ceasefire commissioner Adam Ali Ware reported that no progress has been made on the implementation of the September 19 Minnawi-Taha agreement, other than the halting of military operations. He lamented that the lack of savvy within the SLM/MM movement is as much of a hindrance to its implementation as the GOS' lack of sincerity. UNAMID officials acknowledged their continued inability to adequately respond to security incidents, but are hopeful that increased political engagement with rebel factions will lead to an environment of greater security. End Summary.

SPLM MINISTER SURVIVES AMBUSH IN SOUTH DARFUR  
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12. (SBU) On October 4 poloff spoke with Omer Abdel Rahman Adam, Minister of Agriculture of South Darfur and leader of the 18 SPLM officials who withdrew from the three state governments following the August 25 killings in Kalma Camp (Ref A). On September 30, Adam was the target of an apparent assassination attempt (though it could also have been a very aggressive group of bandits) from which he and his family escaped unharmed, though his bodyguard was shot and killed.

13. (SBU) Adam stated that on September 30, he was driving from Nyala to Kass for the Eid holiday to visit relatives. A body guard occupied the passenger seat, while his wife and infant daughter sat in the back. After passing the Bulbul area of South Darfur, he reached Moraya Jangi, where he heard three shots he recognized as coming from a G3 (7.62 mm automatic rifle), though he did not see the shooters. He continued driving and soon after reached a bridge. As soon as he drove onto the bridge two men emerged armed with AK-47s. "I realized then that the three shots I heard earlier were a signal for them to block the road," he said. "I decided not to stop, and tried to overtake them with the car." One gunman fired shots into the windshield, striking the bodyguard, who later died of his injuries. Adam was not hit and continued to drive, successfully fleeing the scene. About 100 meters down the road, he realized that his fuel tank had been hit.

14. (SBU) Adam stated that he kept driving, and after about 2 kilometers, he reached a SAF checkpoint where he was stopped and told the soldiers about the incident. There were approximately 30-35 soldiers present at the checkpoint, equipped only with one technical (mounted with a 12.7 mm "Doushka") and a motorcycle. The soldiers proceeded immediately to the scene of the ambush, some in the vehicles and the rest on foot. "They caught three of them," he said,

but refused to speculate on the identity of the perpetrators. (Note: a UN Security Situation Rep stated that reports suggest six persons have been arrested and taken to Nyala. He further noted that the Wali of South Darfur has indicated that the perpetrators will be brought to justice, and the trial will be covered by the media so that citizens will see the identity of the perpetrators and to which tribe they belong. End Note.) Adam stated that Salva Kiir has also formed an SPLM committee to investigate the incident.

15. (SBU) Adam proceeded to Kass and arrived at the hospital, where he was met by supporters. He returned to Nyala that night in a military and police convoy, along with the body of his guard, who was later buried. Since then, "over 10,000 people came to my house to offer condolences," he said. Adam will soon be traveling to Khartoum and will meet with poloffs to further discuss the incident, to be reported septel.

#### SKEPTICISM ABOUNDS ON DPA IMPLEMENTATION

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16. (SBU) On September 29, poloff met with SLM/MM former ceasefire commissioner Adam Ali Ware in El Fasher to discuss implementation of the September 19 Taha-Minnawi Agreement (Ref B). According to Ware, "no progress has been made, other than the halting of military operations." But even this may not last, he said, noting that there has been a constant movement of troops in North Darfur for the past several weeks. Ware stated that in the week immediately following the signing of the agreement, more than 120 4x4 vehicles modified for military use (in the style typical of SLA) have been brought to Darfur by the SAF. There are conflicting reports as to whether these vehicles were delivered to Chadian rebels or are for SAF use, he

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said. In addition, Ware stated there has been a mobilization of Arab militia forces from Kabkabiya to Kutum. Despite the fact that the ceasefire has been honored, even by non-signatories, Ware stated that it was "highly probable" that the GOS would launch new military offensives during Eid to catch the rebels offguard (though this prediction was later proven false).

17. (SBU) Ware was pessimistic about the implementation of the DPA, in part because of the government's lack of willingness, but also due to the inadequacies of his own movement. "It really depends on who we bring to the negotiating table," he said, noting that the GOS is full of very clever negotiators, something which his own organization lacks. "Tijani is one of the very few capable" within SLA/MM, he said. "We have people who don't understand what's written in front of them," he said. He lamented that instead of enlisting support from Darfurians with experience in politics and policy, favoritism and cronyism have prevailed among SLA/MM. The movement is also beset with command and control problems, he said. Ware says he was planning to go out to the field, but Minnawi instructed him to remain in El Fasher because he needs him there. "For what exactly?" Ware wondered, noting that the ceasefire commission has been long dead. (Note: Tijani told polchief October 4 that he remained optimistic that the Presidency would issue several decrees in the coming days that would link the DPA with the Interim National Constitution, as agreed between Minnawi and VP Taha in El Fasher. Tijani said his meetings with Finance Minister Awad Al-Jaz had gone well the previous week, and he remained hopeful that money would be released into the TDRA. End note.)

#### UNAMID A POOR SUBSTITUTE FOR CEASEFIRE COMMISSION

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18. (SBU) Ware stated that UNAMID has been a poor replacement for his former ceasefire commission. "In the days of the ceasefire commission, we'd be on site within several hours of reports of an incident," he said. "I won't name names, but several senior [UNAMID] military officers" have been unresponsive to reports of fighting. "They have their phones switched off, they don't answer, or they tell you not to call them directly," he scoffed.

19. (SBU) Kemal Saoki, Director of UNAMID's Communication and Public Information Division, acknowledged that UNAMID faces great challenges in responding to security incidents. Because UNAMID's

military forces are so thinly stretched, "we have no means of verification" of such incidents, he said. "We can only confirm them through circumstantial evidence." He continued that UNAMID is often the last to know when fighting takes place, noting that he has frequently informed UNAMID military personnel of reports of fighting after receiving press inquiries. "The rebels are very deft in their communications and use of the media," he said, explaining how commanders on the ground will call their spokesmen based overseas, who in turn call Khartoum-based journalists, who then call UNAMID. "Often we're not in a position to inform them," he said. He was pessimistic that this would change, even with increased deployment, though he noted that increased aerial capability would certainly help.

¶10. (SBU) Sunday Ochoche, Acting Head of UNAMID's Political Affairs section, noted that UNAMID must engage with Darfur's rebel factions to counter the latter's feelings of marginalization and bring them into the fold for better cooperation on security. He noted that a recent UNAMID visit to Suleiman Marjan had been "very useful" in this regard, and that he was looking forward to returning to SLM/MM controlled areas from October 9-11 for similar outreach and engagement. Ochoche, a thoughtful former professor and former director of Nigeria's Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, also spoke of the challenges created by UNAMID's hybrid mission status with regard to the possible ICC indictment of President Bashir. "The UN is pulling in one direction [with regard to the ICC], while AU country leaders are pulling in the other," he said. Darfurians know whose side the AU is on, and this creates "critical challenges for the functioning of UNAMID." The arrival of the Chinese engineering contingent is also a worry, he said, noting that Darfurians were "very afraid of Chinese troops." Adam Ali Ware noted that many Darfurians also had a negative perception of Egyptian and Jordanian troops, believing that as Arabs they are aligned with the GOS, but that he himself had found them to be neutral. "They are among the best and have exceeded people's expectations," he said, noting that the same could not be said for AU troops.

#### MORE DARFUR INITIATIVES

¶11. (SBU) On September 29 poloff met with Ismail Rashid, program

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manager for Save the Children/Sweden in El Fasher and Fur community activist. Rashid stated that he and other local Fur leaders are working on a communique for concrete, grassroots proposals for Darfur, which he characterized as "not an initiative, but rather, a vision" of a stable developing region. The vision contains the familiar themes of power sharing, security provisions and justice, as well as addressing issues of social and cultural rights. It also proposes the revival of traditional methods of justice and reconciliation, said Rashid, who had himself participated in the 1989 reconciliation conference following the Arab-Fur conflict. He noted that the "vision" differentiated itself from other civil society efforts by representing IDPs on the ground, unlike the various conference that have taken place outside of Sudan. "Those discussions are not relevant or representative," he said. "They discuss issues from an academic point of view, and opinions are limited to those attending the workshop," adding that they undermine grassroots efforts.

¶12. (SBU) On September 29 poloff met with Abdelshafie Eissa Mustafa, a Fur SPLM Member and Minister of Health in North Darfur, at the SPLM offices in El Fasher (Note: Like other SPLM Ministers in Darfur, Mustafa withdrew from the government following the August 25 Kalma Camp killings.) Mustafa stated that while the SPLM has joined the president's Sudan People's Initiative on Darfur, he and other Darfurian SPLM members have been asked by Juba to form a taskforce to articulate the SPLM's official view. Mustafa welcomed this opportunity for involvement, noting that one of the SPLM's earlier mistakes was not to involve its Darfuri members in its rebel unification efforts. He noted that SPLM grassroots efforts to unite the rebels were ongoing, but dismissed any attempt by the NCP to solve the Darfur crisis. "All the recent battles have been initiated by the government," he said, adding that "we've seen nothing new" since Taha's visit to Darfur on September 19.

## COMMENT

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¶13. (SBU) Comment: While the near-death experience of one of its top ministers in Darfur may momentarily shift SPLM attention back to the region, it's unlikely to herald a new chapter for SPLM involvement in resolving the Darfur crisis. To date this involvement has lacked focus and consistency. Observers have noted that previous efforts by Juba to unite Darfur's rebel factions were more of a way for the SPLM to exert leverage on the NCP than an attempt to bring peace to Darfur. There is considerable pessimism on the implementation of the Minnawi-Taha agreement, while the various Darfuri civil society groups remain the most advanced in their thinking on possible solutions to the Darfur crisis. Septel will report on several current initiatives - all of which focus on one unified Darfur region, a vice president to come from Darfur, wealth-sharing based on population size leading to greater development, security and compensation for IDPs, and land rights including a return to the traditional Hakura land tenure system - as key ingredients to an eventual peace agreement.

ASQUINO